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A FUZZY SIMULATION MODEL FOR EVALUATING THE CONCESSION ITEMS 
OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP SCHEMES 
 
Abstract:  
The investment return, tariff regime and concession period are the most important items that 
influence the success of a concession-based Public-Private Partnership (PPP) project.  From 
the public partner’s perspective, whether a scheme is value-for-money or not dominates the 
decision making process.  However, a seemingly favorable deal may turn out to be the least 
value-for-money option should it cause unnecessary social upheaval, such as excessive tariff 
increases or complaints.  A scheme which is truly value-for-money is one which balances the 
interests of the public partner, investor and end-users.  In this paper, a simulation model is 
proposed to assist a public partner to identify the concession period based on the expected 
investment and tariff regime.  The needs for establishing different scenarios to represent the 
risks and uncertainties involved are presented, and a fuzzy multi-objective decision model is 
introduced to trade-off the associated three concession items.  The combined features of the 
simulation and fuzzy multi-objective decision models enable the scenario most likely to result 
in a “win-win-win” concession scheme to be identified.  A hypothetical example is used to 
illustrate the proposed model.  This highlights the importance of the decision-makers’ 
perception of the concession items in influencing their selection, and the influence of the 
group decision-making involved.    
 
Keywords:  Concession period, fuzzy sets, public-private partnership, simulation, tariff 
regime   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
An increasing number of construction industry stakeholders are striving to exploit the 
potential of opening up publicly owned and operated facilities/services to the private sector.  
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) offer one means of achieving this by attaining a “win-win-
win” situation among the government, business sector and end-users (cf: Angeles and Walker, 
2000; Akintoye et al, 2003).  In fact, there is no shortage of successful PPP examples 
(Confoy et al, 1999; Magub and Hampson, 1999; Miller and Evje, 1999; Delmon, 2000; 
Pietroforte and Miller, 2002; Vorster et al, 2002).  These have often provided significant 
overall cost savings for the project (HM Treasury, 2000; Chege and Rwelamila, 2001; New 
South Wales Government, 2001; Victorian Government, 2001), more timely delivery of 
facilities/services (Clifford Chance, 2001) and better productivity performance and 
innovation (Earl and Regan, 2003).  
 
In one of the most popular PPP alternatives, the concession scheme, the investor raises the 
necessary funding and provides the physical facility as well as maintaining and operating the 
completed asset (Zhang and Kumaraswamy, 2001).  In return, they recover their capital 
investment according to the terms set out in the concession agreement viz. the concession 
period, a proposed tariff regime and an expected investment return (Ngee et al, 1997).  To 
ensure the scheme is financially viable and attractive, the investor might seek to initiate a 
higher expected investment return especially when the concession period is short.  With an 
assured minimum profit proviso, the concessionaire may increase the tariff in case the 
scheme fails to reach its expected investment return.  Yet, any upward adjustment in tariff 
will attract criticisms from the user and pressure groups.  From the government’s perspective 
whether or not a PPP scheme is of value-for-money is the prime concern; and those with 
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unrealistically high expected returns and/or excessively lengthy concession periods may be 
conceived as a transfer of interest (Efficiency Unit, 2003).  Hence, there is a legitimate need 
to balance the interests of all the stakeholders before a concession agreement is reached.   
 
In practice, the government relies on the Pay Back Period (PBP) under the minimal Internal 
Rate of Return (IRR) as expected by the concessionaire to determine the concession period 
(Shen and Li, 2000).  This enables the PBP to be easily computed by the conventional Net 
Present Value (NPV) method.  As an alternative, Ngee et al (1997) have developed a multiple 
linear regression model which enables the value of any concession item to be calculated when 
the other two items are known.  Both these approaches, however, are dominated by high 
levels of risk and uncertainty (fluctuations in interest rate, inflation, cost, revenue, etc.).  An 
overly optimistic estimate based on the cash flow evaluation, for instance, could mean that 
the return rate expected by the concessionaire may never be realized during the agreed 
concession period.  Therefore, when establishing the concession items, due consideration of 
the effects of the risks and uncertainties involved is needed.  A further salient issue is the 
need to embrace the views of various stakeholders – the public partner, the investor and the 
end-users – when the concession items are determined. 
 
This paper proposes a model to determine the concession items that best satisfies the various 
stakeholders involved in a PPP scheme.  This firstly uses simulation techniques to deduce a 
concession period based upon the minimum expected IRR and tariff regime proposed.  Fuzzy 
set theory is then applied to enable the concession items to be evaluated via a range of 
possible scenarios.  This enables a non-inferior solution for conflicting objectives to be 
deduced.  Through the model results, the public partner can select the most satisfactory 
alternative for proposal invitation and further evaluation.  The paper begins by outlining the 
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features of the simulation model.  It is then followed by an introduction of the model 
components.  Finally, a hypothetical example is applied to illustrate the operation of the 
model.   
 
 
MODELING RISKS THROUGH SIMULATION  
 
Acknowledging the strength of simulation in analyzing the effects of risks, models have been 
developed using the Monte Carlo approach to determine the concession period (Shen et al, 
2002; Shen and Wu, 2005; Zhang and AbouRizk, 2006) and analyze the risks involved in 
concession projects (Malini, 1999) based on the simulated values of such financial indicators 
as NPV and IRR.  However, the risk analysis model developed by Malini (1999) was based 
on deterministic parameters, which restricts its applicability to the selection of a concession 
period only from some finite scenarios.  The model also assumes that some macro-economic 
indicators, such as interest and inflation rates, can be estimated with certainty.  In reality 
these macro-economic indicators may well be major risks in themselves.   
 
Figure 1 portrays a new simulation model to accommodate the complex implications of the 
various risks associated with concession-based PPP projects.  In this model, the concession 
period is an output rather than an input parameter.  Since securing a desirable return is the 
most important consideration of any commercial organization, it is sensible to assume that a 
reasonable tariff regime and a minimal IRR can be established in advance.  By inputting the 
tariff regime and the IRR into the simulation model, the exact concession period in each 
simulation cycle can be computed from simulated costs and revenues.  With sufficient 
iterations, a frequency distribution related to the concession period can be generated. 
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< Figure 1 > 
 
Deterministic Parameters 
 
Construction period (Tc):   The concession period is composed of construction and operation 
periods.  Under normal circumstances, the time required for completing the construction 
work is uncertain as project delay is common in practice.  However, the construction period 
can be treated as a deterministic input in a concession scheme as the investor would enjoy a 
longer operation period by shortening the time for construction while the concession period 
remains the same (Yi and Tiong, 2003).  By controlling the construction period, the identified 
risks may be converted into opportunities.  Hence, the input data can be based simply on the 
most likely construction period as estimated by the public partner. 
 
Return rate:   The amount of money required to raise the finance through different types of 
capital, such as equity and debt, commonly known as the weighted average capital cost is the 
lowest return rate for an investment (Bierman and Smidt, 1993).  It follows that the minimum 
expected IRR can be based on the weighted average capital cost of a concession scheme.  For 
simulation purposes, it is necessary to determine the capital costs of the proposed scheme and 
the equity/debt ratio so as to compute the weighted average capital cost.   
 
Tariff regime:   The tariff regime is based on (i) the statistical data gathered from similar 
projects; (ii) the amount the end-users is willing to pay; and (iii) the micro economic forecast 
(Malini, 1999).  To accommodate these constraints, different tariff regimes can be set for 
different scenarios to facilitate comparison. 
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Uncertain Parameters 
 
Cost in year ‘t’ (Ct):   This cost comprises all the expenses incurred in designing, 
constructing, operating, managing and maintaining the facility.  However, the accuracy of the 
estimation is influenced by several risk factors such as changes in interest rates and inflation 
(Zayed and Chang, 2002).  In the proposed model, it is necessary to (i) identify the major risk 
factors that could have serious effects on the cost; (ii) establish an empirical or assumed 
probability distribution for each of the identified risk factors (in discrete or continuous form); 
and (iii) examine the effects of the risk factors on the cost (cf: Cagno and di Milano, 2001).   
Since the estimated cost is more affected by changes in inflation rates, a (normal) probability 
distribution is assigned to represent the interest rate fluctuation in the model (cf: Wen and 
Kang, 2001).   
 
Operation Revenue in year ‘t’ (Rt):   The revenue of a concession-based PPP project is 
determined by the number of users as well as the tariff regime.  While the tariff regime is 
agreed by the public and private partners, the number of users may vary according to the 
availability of alternatives and/or economic growth within the locality.  In a concession-based 
PPP, the user/volume risk can be estimated by a projection of statistics of similar facilities.  
Figure 2 illustrates the annual traffic flow record of a PPP project.  From this, the growth rate 
and stochastic errors can be established through, for example, linear regression analysis.  
Such data can be used to construct a normal distribution curve for user volume (Shen and Wu, 
2005). 
 
< Figure 2 > 
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Income in year ‘t’ (It):   The annual income in the operation period is the difference between 
the revenue generated and the costs associated with the operation, management and 
maintenance of the asset in the corresponding year. 
 
Simulation Output 
 
Having established the input parameters, the simulation process can begin.  By repeating the 
simulation for a 1,000 iterations, a cumulative frequency distribution of the concession period 
as shown in Figure 3 can be generated.   
 
< Figure 3 > 
 
Inspection of the simulation results enables the public partner to determine an appropriate 
concession period to guarantee the concessionaire a minimal IRR under the proposed tariff 
regime and associated confidence level.  Therefore, by referring to the cumulative frequency 
distribution (Figure 3), if the goal was to ensure the investor achieves the minimum expected 
IRR with confidence level of 80%, then the government might wish to fix the concession 
period to 17 years, as there is 80.4% confidence that the concessionaire can attain the 
minimal return rate for this period.  Likewise, with 90% confidence, the concession period 
must be set at 18 years.   
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MULTI-OBJECTIVE DECISION MODEL  
 
By using the above simulation model, the public client can establish an appropriate 
concession period for each proposal.  However, as public sector organizations are the only 
parties who can strike a balance of value-for-money, financial viability and social interests, 
they should aim to ensure the greatest satisfaction of not just themselves but also those of the 
private sector and end-users.  A practicable strategy would be to institute feasible options 
based on the concession periods and different combinations of expected IRR and tariff 
regimes; and select one which would balance the interests of all major stakeholders.   
 
Such arrangements will not only help ensure the identification of an appropriate concession 
period for the purposes of proposal invitation, but the corresponding tariff regime and 
investment return can also serve as a basis for proposal evaluation at a later stage, as this 
should be the most preferred scenario for all parties.  However, to select an appropriate 
scenario (with due consideration of the concession period, expected IRR and tariff regimes 
amongst different alternatives) is never a simple task due to the diverse perspectives of 
decision-makers concerning concession items.  The diversity of interests of the public sector, 
investors and end-users makes the evaluation a multi-objective decision problem (see Eqn. 1): 
 





periodConcession
regimeTariff
IRR
 min
 min
max
 [1] 
 
Since the objectives are conflicting, there is hardly any alternative which could fulfill all the 
three objectives at the same time.  Characterized by conflicting and vague objectives, it is 
inevitable for the decision-makers to rely on their own judgment during the decision making 
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process.  As a result, an effective means to deal with the perceptions of decision-makers is 
needed.  Being recognized as an effective technique for modeling imprecise domains and 
solving multi-objective decision problems (Roman, 1998; Zimmermann, 2001), fuzzy set 
theory should help provide an effective solution with due consideration of all different 
options.   
 
Fuzzy set ideas were first introduced by Lukasiewica in 1920 and subsequently developed by 
Zadeh into a formal system of mathematical logic for representing issues without precise 
boundaries.  Fuzzy set theory can be defined as a branch of logic based on the degrees of 
membership in sets rather than strict (crisp) true/false membership.  Following Zadeh (1965, 
1971) and Zimmermann (2001), the concept of fuzzy sets can be represented so that if X is a 
collection of objects denoted generically by x, then a fuzzy set 
~
A  in X is a set of ordered 
pairs:  
 
( ){ }XxxxA
A
∈= |, ~
~
µ  [2] 
 
where ( )x
A
~µ  is a membership function taking values from [0,1] specifying to what degree x 
belongs to 
~
A .  
 
For a multi-objective decision problem where the objectives are conflicting, makes it difficult 
to obtain an optimal solution: 
 
( ){ }miXxxf i ,...,2,1,minmax/ =∈  [3] 
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This can then be transformed into a fuzzy multi-objective decision model as follows: 
 
( )





 =∈ miXxx
if
,...,2,1,max ~µ  [4] 
 
where 
i
f
~
 is a fuzzy set in field ( ){ }XxfxffxX iiii ∈≤≤= ,supinf ; supinf  and ii ff  are the 
inferior and superior boundaries of ( )xfi  respectively; ( )x
if
~µ  is the degree of membership 
that x belongs to 
i
f
~
 , where ( )x
if
~µ  is simply denoted as ( )xiµ  in the following part). 
 
For the maximization objectives, the membership function is determined by: 
 
( ) ( )
ip
ii
ii
i
ff
fxf
x








−
−
=
infsup
infµ                                           [5] 
 
while, for the minimization objectives, the membership function is determined by: 
 
( )
( ) ip
ii
ii
i
ff
xff
x








−
−
=
infsup
supµ                                           [6] 
 
where ip is a exponential parameter and usually a set value of 1. 
 
For some subjective goal, where the evaluations for alternatives are linguistic ranked such as 
“very unsatisfied”, “unsatisfied”, “moderate”, “satisfied” and “very satisfied”, the fixed 
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degrees can be set to represent the ranks, for example {0.1, 0.3, 0.5. 0.7. 0.9}, to present the 
above ranking set. 
 
Here the max-min composition approach is adopted to derive a non-inferior solution (Ragab 
and Emmam, 1995; Luoh et al, 2002), as it is a simple and feasible method to solve the fuzzy 
multi-objective decision problem (Sanchez, 1976; CMU, 1993; Li, 1997; Slowinski, 1998; 
Chrr and Tah, 2001).  Despite being relatively conservative (Zimmermann, 2001), the max-
min composition approach can avoid non-inferior solutions from having a minimal 
membership value.  In other words, the minimal membership value of the derived solution 
would not be the worst result when compared with that of the other alternatives.  Therefore, 
the non-inferior solution is deduced by the max-min composition as expressed by:  
 
( ){ }ji
ijji
xµµ minmax** =  [7] 
 
where ( )ji xµ  is simply denoted as ijµ  in the following part (cf: Kandasamy and 
Smarandache, 2004). 
 
The above equation implies that each objective has an equal weight, but if the decision-
makers set different weight for each objective, then the composition becomes: 
 
( ){ }iij
ijji
ωµµ minmax** =  [8] 
 
where iω  is the weight of objective i. 
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Adopting the above concepts for evaluating various options of concession items leads to an 
evaluation model as follows:  
 
  Let { } PeriodConcessionf Regime, IRR, TarifX = : = a set of objectives [9] 
{ }
N1
ernative, ..., AlteAlternativA = : = a set of alternatives [10] 
and a weight set on { }321 ,,: ωωω=WX  expresses the weight of each factor in X [11] 
 
Then, the MOD problem is to select an optimal alternative leading to:  
 





periodConcession
regimeTariff
IRR
 min
 min
max
 
 
and transfer the objective value of each alternative to the membership value according to the 
membership functions in Eqns. 5 and 6.  Once the fuzzy relationship is established, it is easier 
to deduce the non-inferior solutions by using Eqn. 7 or 8. 
 
 
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE 
 
In order to demonstrate how the simulation model and the evaluation method work, the 
following simple road project is used: 
o the construction period is 5 years, 
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o the construction cost is $100,000,000 (which, for simplicity, will be apportioned in 
accordance with a 5-year construction period at 10%, 20%, 30%, 20%, and 20% 
respectively), 
o the annum operation and maintenance cost is 15% of the annum operation revenue, 
o the estimated traffic volume and proposed tariff regime is as shown in Table 1, 
o the minimum expected IRR is 13%, and 
o the concession period is 15 years. 
 
< Table 1 > 
 
Conventional NPV analysis was first conducted to analyze the data.  The results show the 
NPV to be $6,982,300 while the PBP is 13.59 years.  The initial analysis indicates the scheme 
is viable (NPV>0) and the concessionaires can recover their investment before the end of the 
concession period (PBP<15).   
 
Incorporating Risk Factors in the Simulation Process 
 
It is assumed that the following are the major risk factors that could affect the cash flow of 
the above hypothetical example:  
o inflation rate – the rate of change follows a normal distribution with mean and standard 
deviation equivalent to 2.5% and 2% respectively, 
o traffic flow – the estimated average annual traffic volume follows a normal distribution 
with standard deviation to 20% of the first year’s traffic volume, and 
o operation cost – the annual operation and maintenance costs follow a uniform distribution 
in the interval [0.13, 0.17]. 
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The above data (Scenario 1) was entered into the simulation model developed in Matlab to 
generate the cumulative probability of the concession period.  After running the simulation 
procedure 1,000 times, the cumulative frequency distribution as shown in Figure 4 was 
derived.  From Figure 4, it is apparent that the cumulative probability of the minimum 
expected IRR in the 15th year is 0.4550.  This suggests that the initial decision of fixing the 
concession period to 15 years is rather risky to the investor, as there is a 45.5% chance that 
such a period can just ensure the minimum expected IRR of 13% be realized.  In other words, 
there is a 54.5% chance that the IRR will not reach the minimum level.  Therefore, the 
scheme is unlikely to be accepted by the concessionaire and it will also be difficult for the 
two sides to arrive at an agreement based on this concession period. 
 
< Figure 4 > 
 
When it is necessary to ensure the concessionaire could gain the minimum expected IRR with 
a high confidence level (say 0.90), the decision-makers would favor extending the concession 
period to 16.37 years (see Figure 4). 
 
As discussed earlier, it would be preferable for decision-makers to consider several 
alternatives before a final decision is reached.  For example, a more optimistic scenario might 
be found to reflect the possibility of having a risk seeking investor who is prepared to accept 
a lower IRR and tariff regime.  Likewise, a pessimistic alternative can also be considered by 
the decision-makers.  To illustrate the concept, two further scenarios are proposed to 
represent the optimistic and pessimistic alternatives respectively: 
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Scenario 2:  
o Discount rate (the minimum expected IRR) = 0.12 
o Tariff regime: the tariff is 10% less than the most likely tariff 
 
Scenario 3:  
o Discount rate (the minimum expected IRR) = 0.14 
o Tariff regime: the tariff is 20% more than the basic tariff  
 
Running the simulation model in accordance with the conditions stated in Scenarios 2 and 3 
respectively, the cumulative probability curves shown in Figure 5 were generated.  Applying 
the above criteria for determining the concession period, the appropriate concession periods 
for the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are 17.40 years and 14.17 years respectively. 
 
< Figure 5 > 
 
Evaluating the Three Scenarios 
 
The results generated by the simulation model would enable the decision-makers to evaluate 
each scenario according to the three factors – the minimum expected IRR, tariff regime, and 
concession period – which constitute the set of objectives (X).  The details of concession 
items for each scenario are summarized in Table 2. 
 
< Table 2 > 
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Assuming that the decision-makers set a possible interval for IRR as [8%,20%] and for 
concession period as [10,25], then the degree of membership can be derived according to 
Eqns. 5 and 6.  Therefore, the degree of membership for Alternative 1 to the objective of 
maximal IRR can be calculated as below: 
 
42.0
%8%20
%8%13
11 =−
−
=µ  
 
and the degree of membership of Alternative 1 to the objective of minimal concession period 
can be calculated as: 
 
58.0
1025
37.1625
13 =−
−
=µ  
 
while the other degrees of membership can be derived in a similar manner. 
 
Since the tariff regime is not represented by a single value, Eqn. 6 cannot be applied to derive 
the degree of membership.  As a result, a representative from the end-users group is selected 
to evaluate each tariff regime.  Let the evaluation results for these three tariff regimes be 
moderate, satisfied and unsatisfied, then 0.5, 0.7 and 0.3 are the degree of membership for 
those tariff regimes.  The degree of membership can be summarized in Table 3. 
 
< Table 3 > 
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Here we assume that the weightings of the three concession items are equal.  Then, the non-
inferior solution can be deduced based on the degree of membership matrix through the max-
min composition as Eqn. 7: 
 
( ){ }ji
ijji
xµµ minmax** =  










=
≤≤≤≤
72.051.058.0
30.070.050.0
50.033.042.0
minmax
3131 ij
 
( )30.033.042.0max
31 ≤≤
=
j
 
1142.0 µ==  
 
From the above results, decision-makers can conclude that Scenario 1 is the most preferable 
with the preference order being Scenarios 1, 2 and 3.  This implies that Scenario 1 can 
provide the greatest degree of satisfaction to the decision-makers. 
 
In the above example, it was assumed that the decision-makers would assign an equal 
weighting to the three concession items.  Changing the weighting set to W = {0.3,0.5,0.2}, 
gives a different the evaluation result.  By using Eqn. 8:  
 
( ){ }iij
ijji
ωµµ minmax** =  










=
≤≤≤≤
94.087.090.0
55.084.071.0
81.072.077.0
minmax
3131 ij
 
( )55.072.071.0max
31 ≤≤
=
j
 
2172.0 µ==  
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While Scenario 2 is the most preferable, the preference order now becomes Scenarios 2, 1 
and 3. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper proposes a method by which both simulation and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation 
can be combined to establish the most satisfactory concession item options for PPP projects.  
By incorporating the complex impact of risks involved, an appropriate concession period can 
be deduced by a simulation based on the minimum expected IRR and tariff regime.  However, 
as the actual IRR and tariff regime would not be known at the proposal invitation stage, 
alternative scenarios need to be generated for consideration.  The purpose of the fuzzy 
comprehensive evaluation process is to enable decision-makers to select the most preferable 
alternative from a list of possible scenarios, such that the concession period would be used for 
proposal invitation, while the corresponding tariff regime and investment return could serve 
as a basis for proposal evaluation at a later stage.  The simulation process and the application 
of fuzzy theory have also been illustrated through a hypothetical example.   
 
The proposed simulation model could assist decision-makers establish a concession period 
for a PPP project that is acceptable to both the public and private partners; i.e. (i) to ensure 
the concessionaire gains a reasonable return, and (ii) to allow the public client to reclaim the 
facility at an appropriate time.  After devising different possible alternatives of the concession 
items using the simulation technique, decision-makers could then evaluate the three 
concession items (i.e. IRR, tariff regime and concession period) of each alternative.  The 
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results would provide the fuzzy relations between the three items and alternatives.  Then, 
through the fuzzy composite method, the non-inferior solution could be obtained to maximize 
the satisfaction of all the three parties.   
 
While the proposed simulation model and fuzzy MOD could provide decision-makers with a 
useful tool for establishing an optimal alternative of concession items for a PPP project, 
further improvement may be needed to make the process more implementable.  For instance, 
it may not be easy for decision-makers to accurately predict the risk factors affecting the 
uncertain parameters.  In addition, there is no clear method for determining the weighting that 
each concession item contributes to the evaluation.  There is also a need to combine various 
composition methods other than the more conservative max-min method to deduce the non-
inferior solution for decision-makers with different risk attitudes.  
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Figure 1:  Simulation flow diagram for determining the concession period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A simulation cycle start, let 
t = 0, NPV = 0 
t = t +1 
Generate some random numbers to determine 
the risk values affecting the operation cost. 
Calculate the construction cost of year t, Ct. 
Discount Ct to calculate NPV by using 
proposed return rate. 
Calculate the income of year t: It 
= Rt - Ct 
Discount It to calculate NPV by 
using proposed return rate. 
 
 t = Tc? 
Yes 
 No 
Yes 
No 
 NPV ? 0? 
A simulation cycle end 
Concession period = t 
t = t +1 
Generate some random numbers to determine 
the risk values affecting the operation cost. 
Calculate the operation cost of year t, Ct. 
Generate a random numbers to 
determine the user quantity of year t. 
Toll/tariff regime + user quantity → 
operation revenue, Rt. 
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Figure 2:  Annual traffic flow of the Cross Harbor Tunnel in Hong Kong 
(Source: Traffic and Transport Digest, Transport Department, HKSAR) 
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Figure 3:  Simulated frequency distribution of the concession period 
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Figure 4:  The cumulative probability curves of the concession period for scenario 1 
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Figure 5:  The cumulative probability curves of the concession period for the three scenarios 
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Table 1:  Estimated traffic volume and basic tariff regime 
 
Vehicle type Estimated number of 
vehicles (million) 
Estimated annual 
growth rate (%) 
Basic toll rate 
per trip 
Cars/vans 0.8 5 10 
Buses 0.6 4 20 
Trucks 0.3 5 20 
Motorbikes 0.6 5 2 
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Table 2:   Concession items for the three scenarios 
 
                     Scenario 
Concession items 
Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3 
IRR 13% 12% 14% 
Tariff regime T (data in Table1) 0.9*T 1.2*T 
Concession period 16.37 Years 17.40 Years 14.17 Years 
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Table 3:  Degree of membership matrix for the three scenarios 
 
                                   A 
X 
Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3 
IRR 0.42 0.33 0.50 
Tariff regime 0.50 0.70 0.30 
Concession period 0.58 0.51 0.72 
 
 
 
 
